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I. THEORY: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATION 
The task that this thesis has set for itself is very 
straightforward. It is to show that successful democratic 
transition and consolidation is attainable in Nigeria if 
only the successive civilian controlled governments would 
devise control strategies (even if unconventional in the 
short run) to check military opportunism and strengthen 
their own rule. It will trace the roots of recurrent 
failure of democratic experiments in Nigeria and draw 
lessons from Kenya and Botswana, two sisters’ African 
countries with successful democratic transitions. Policy 
recommendations toward reducing or eliminating the problem 
will be offered. 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to examine 
the theory of democratic transition and civil-military 
relations as a theoretical background to understanding 
Nigeria’s situation. In order to achieve this, an attempt 
would be made to address the following set of questions: 
What is a completed democratic transition and 
consolidation? Why would a country want to transit to 
democracy or why transitions from authoritarianism to 
democracy? What are the ingredients of a successful 
democratic transition and consolidation or what Linz and 
Stepan (1996) would call conditions (or arenas) that must 
exist for a democracy to be consolidated? What are the 
obstacles to a successful democratic transition and how can 
these obstacles be surmounted? What does the civil-military 
relations theory intends to teach democratic leaders? 
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Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1997) 
defined a regime transition as a shift from one set of 
political procedures to another, from an old pattern of 
rule to a new one. According to them, regime transition may 
occur by means of a short, sharp transformation – for 
example, when a coercive autocracy collapses and give way 
to an elected democracy. Or a transition may unfold 
incrementally, as when a personal dictatorship gradually 
relaxes controls on his political opponents and introduces 
a softer, more liberalized form of authoritarian rule. In 
the case of Nigeria, it experienced a shift from British 
colonial rule to democratic rule in 1960 and again from 
military dictatorship to democratic rule in 1979 and 1999. 
However, it is not enough for an authoritarian system 
to give way to elected democracy. It has to be completed 
and consolidated. “A democratic transition is complete when 
sufficient agreement has been reached about political 
procedures to produce an elected government, when a 
government comes to power that is the direct result of a 
free and popular vote, when this government de facto has 
the authority to generate new policies, and when the 
executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the 
new democracy does not have to share power with other 
bodies de jure” (Linz  and Stepan, 1996, 3). 
The pertinent question now is why democracy? Why did 
Nigeria, for instance, transited from a relatively peaceful 
but authoritarian British colonial rule to the turbulent 
democratic rule of the early 1960s? Why did Nigerians 
reject military dictatorship, even after several years’ 
military administrations and embraced democratic rule in 
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1979 and 1999? What is so special about democracy over 
other forms of government? 
Democratization is generally a good thing and that 
democracy is the best form of government.  If democracy is 
thought of simply as the rule of the people, as a system of 
choosing government through free and fair electoral 
competition at regular intervals, governments chosen in 
this manner are generally better than those that are not. 
They usually offer the best prospect for accountable, 
responsive, peaceful, predictable, good governance. 
Consequently, up to a point consistent with the principles 
of constitutionalism and representative democracy, 
government is better when it is more democratic. (Diamond, 
1999, 3)  
There is a powerful association between democracy and 
liberty because countries that hold free elections are 
usually more liberal than those that do not and that the 
more closely countries meet the standards of electoral 
democracy, the higher their human rights rating. Although, 
the process of democratization may stimulate ethnic 
conflict (as was and still is the case in Nigeria) and 
induce weak states to meet communal rebellion with 
repression rather than accommodation, “ the resolution of 
ethno political conflicts in institutionalized democracies 
depends most fundamentally on the implementation of 
universalistic norms of equal rights and opportunities for 
all citizens… and pluralistic accommodation of (group) 
desires for separate collective status” (Diamond, 1999, 5)  
Moreover, the policies and institutions that settle ethno 
political conflicts and manage diversity peacefully include 
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full political and civil rights for ethnic minorities, 
programs to alleviate their poverty, protection for them to 
use their languages and cultures, regional autonomy and 
devolution of power and mechanisms or incentives for 
sharing power, constructing multiethnic coalitions, 
encouraging crosscutting alignments, and allowing broad 
access to power at the center. (Diamond, 1999, 6) 
Why is it that Nigeria, and indeed other post-colonial 
African countries could not harness the benefits democratic 
governance? The answer is simple. Only democratic 
transition that is completed and consolidated can fully 
harness all the benefits of democracy. It is an 
incontestable fact that democratic transitions in many 
African countries are yet to be completed and consolidated. 
Even in a few African countries like Kenya and Botswana, 
where democratic transitions may be said to have been 
completed, there are still many tasks that need to be 
accomplished, conditions that must be established, and 
attitudes and habits that must be cultivated before their 
democracies could be considered consolidated. 
What then are the characteristics of a consolidated 
democracy?  We turn to Linz and Stepan (1996) for 
explanations. They provide a working definition of a 
consolidated democracy as follows: 
• Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory 
is consolidated when no significant national, 
social, economic, political, or institutional 
actors spend significant resources attempting to 
achieve their objectives by creating a non-
democratic regime or turning to violence or 
foreign intervention to secede from the state. 
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• Attitudinally, a democratic regime is 
consolidated when a strong majority of public 
opinion holds the believe that democratic 
procedures and institutions are the most 
appropriate way to govern collective life in a 
society such as theirs and when the support for 
antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or 
less isolated from the pro-democratic forces. 
• Constitutionally, a democratic regime is 
consolidated when governmental and non-
governmental forces alike, throughout the 
territory of the state, become subjected to, and 
habituated to, the resolution of conflicts within 
specific laws, procedures, and institutions 
sanctioned by the new democratic process. 
From the above definition, Linz and Stepan conveyed 
the idea that a consolidated democracy is a political 
situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become “ the 
only game in town”.  In other words, with consolidation, 
democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in 
social, institutional, and even psychological life, as well 
as in calculations for achieving success. 
Linz and Stepan also offered five interconnected and 
mutually reinforcing conditions (also referred to as 
arenas) that must exist or be crafted for a democracy to be 
consolidated. First, the conditions must exist for the 
development of a free and lively civil society. Second, 
there must be a relatively autonomous and valued political 
society. Third, there must be a rule of law to ensure legal 
guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent 
associational life. Fourth, there must be a state 
bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic 
government. Fifth, there must be an institutionalized 
economic society. 
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They refer to civil society as that arena of the 
polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and 
individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt 
to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, 
and advance their interest. By political society, they 
refer to that arena in which the polity specifically 
arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise 
control over public power and the state apparatus. To 
achieve a consolidated democracy, the necessary degree of 
autonomy and independence of civil and political society 
must further be embedded in and supported by the rule of 
law, the third arena. All significant actors – especially 
the democratic government and the state – must respect and 
uphold the rule of law, which requires a clear hierarchy of 
laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and 
supported by a strong legal culture in civil society. 
Moreover, modern democracy needs the effective capacity to 
command, regulate, and extract. For this it needs a 
functioning state and a state bureaucracy considered usable 
by the new democratic government. Finally, Linz and Stepan 
posit that modern consolidated democracies require a set of 
socio-politically crafted and socio-politically accepted 
norms, institutions, and regulations, which they call 
economic society, that mediates between state and market. 
Consequently, they conceive a modern consolidated democracy 
as being composed of five major inter-relating arenas, each 
of which, to function properly, has its own primary 
organizing principle. Therefore, to them, a consolidated 
democracy is more than a regime, it is an interacting 
system. 
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There is no doubt that democracy is a better form of 
governance than authoritarianism. Nigeria, and indeed, 
other emergent African countries yearn for this ideal 
system, yet majority of these countries have experienced 
failed democratic transitions and consolidations. What then 
are the impediments to a successful democratization? 
In the literature on the causes of the failure of 
democratization, especially in Africa, emphasis has been 
laid on structural variables. These structural variables 
include social, economic, and political problems and 
weaknesses. The same concept of structure is used in 
referring to both state and society on the one hand, and to 
the military establishment on the other. 
Although some may argue that political, social, 
economic, and cultural factors are at the origin of 
instability, there is less evidence that these factors lead 
to the total collapse of democracy unless other factors 
related to the military as an organization are brought in. 
Consequently, how a civilian regime treats and interact 
with its military will have a direct bearing on how the 
military behaves or reacts, perhaps regardless of 
structural factors. Many authors, including Boubacar 
N’Daiye (2001), Chuka Onwumechili (1998), Claude E. Welch 
(1987), and Eric A. Norlinger (1977) agreed that the 
explanation of structural variables and the collapse of 
democracy have not been satisfactory. Let us examine their 
explanations on political problems, social problems 
(corruption), economic problems, and the problem of the 
military establishment respectively. 
N’Daiye (36-38) writes that many political development 
inspired studies conclude that African military 
intervention and the resultant collapse of democracy is a 
direct result of political underdevelopment. He cited 
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Huntington as one of the proponents of this theory. 
Huntington argues that the newly independent states created 
a high level of political consciousness among the populace. 
This increased the readiness of large masses of people to 
participate in the political process. However, the weak 
structures and administrative capabilities of these states 
have not been able to keep pace. No political institutions 
existed to channel this participation. According to 
Huntington, it is this absence of institutionalization of 
accepted norms of political participation (with adequate 
administrative capabilities), which leads to coups (1968, 
194-198). As a consequence, one of the characteristics of 
developing states is the large number of political players 
and modes of accession to political office. Each group 
employs means, which reflect its “peculiar nature and 
capabilities. The wealthy bribe; students riot; workers 
strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup. In the 
absence of accepted procedures, all these forms of direct 
action are found on the political scene. The techniques of 
military intervention are simply more dramatic and 
effective than the others because, as Hobbes put it, ‘When 
nothing else is turned up, clubs are trumps.’” (Huntington, 
1968, 196). 
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N’Diaye posits that Huntington and other proponents of 
development approach stress the strong relationship between 
political mobilization per se and political pluralism in 
particular as one of the main causes of coups and collapse 
of democracy. He believed that any assessment of the 
political development approach must acknowledge that coups 
have swept away regimes in plural, fragmented politics, but 
also in centralized one party systems and personal 
dictatorships. For example, He said that Senegal and 
Botswana, where political competition has been practiced 
since the last years of colonialism, have not been 
threatened by military intervention. In Ghana and Nigeria, 
after the first successful coup (in circumstances far from 
being marked by political pluralism), coups have occurred 
at frantic pace. 
On corruption, Onwumechili (39-40) writes that 
corruption has been used frequently as an excuse for 
military coups and the eventual collapse of democracy. Coup 
makers especially point to various and sometimes verifiable 
examples of government corruption. However, this may win 
support for the coup makers, but it does not stop 
corruption. Many studies have shown that the coup makers 
themselves become engrossed in corruption, as many of them 
have led some of the most corrupt government in Africa. 
Onwumechili gave the examples of such leaders as Jean-Bedel 
Bokasa in Central African Republic, Mobutu Sese Seko in 
Zaire (now democratic Republic of Congo), and Idi Amin in 
Uganda. He, therefore, concluded that coups do not cure 
corruption. Instead, an effective judicial system under a 
democratic government would take care of most of the 
corrupt practices. 
Welch (2-3) posits that certain underlying 
characteristics of Third World countries, including 
economic problems, may make them more liable to widespread 
military participation in politics. According to him, 
economically, a strong majority of developing countries are 
poor, export dependent, liable to sharp swings in foreign 
exchange earnings due to fluctuations for primary products, 
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and hampered by small domestic markets. World Bank figures 
make these points clear. Members of the Organizations of 
Economic Cooperation and Development – “First World” 
countries – had per capita incomes in 1982 above $11,000 
per annum; low income countries $280 per annum; middle 
income countries (including some petroleum producers) $840 
per annum. In spite of these figures, Welch contends that 
high income is not a prerequisite for civilian control of 
the military as China and India provide striking examples 
to the contrary. Besides, some of the most politically and 
economically dependent countries in Africa, including 
Kenya, Senegal and until recently Ivory Coast have been 
relatively free of military intervention.  
Lastly, on the problems of the military establishment, 
Nordlinger (62-78) analyzed and explained military 
intervention and the collapse of democracy from the 
perspectives of the soldiers themselves. He posits that by 
far the most common and salient interventionist motive 
involves the defense or enhancement of the military’s 
corporate interests. Nordlinger explained that every public 
institution, including the military, perceives their 
interests in similar ways and is concerned with its 
protection and enhancement. They all share an interest in 
adequate budgetary support, autonomy in managing their 
internal affairs, the preservation of their 
responsibilities in the face of encroachments from rival 
institutions, and the continuity of the institution itself. 
These are known as institutions’ corporate interest. 
However, the military differs from most public institutions 
in its cohesiveness and esprit de corps; it differs from 
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all others in the enormous power derived from its 
hierarchical structure and monopoly of violence. 
Consequently, the military believed that the only way 
available to protect or enhance its corporate interest, in 
the event of the breakdown of civil-military relations, is 
through the coup d’ état. The question then, is, when is 
the military interest threatened? Nordlinger provides three 
scenarios, namely budgetary support, military autonomy, and 
the absence of functional rivals and the survival of the 
military.  
A. BUDGETARY SUPPORT 
Adequate budgetary support, as determined by the 
military, constitutes one of its chief corporate interests. 
This is because budgetary allocations affect the material 
well-being, usually the privileged position, of the officer 
corps, including salary scales, the number of promotions, 
retirement benefits, housing facilities, and other 
perquisites. Budgetary changes also serve as a telling 
indicator of the political power and prestige of the armed 
forces, with reductions in expenditures signaling a loss of 
influence and standing. Thus, when civilian governments 
impose reductions or refuse to accede to demands for 
enlarged budgets, it is interpreted by the military that 
their influence and standing is declining. 
Defense expenditures also affect the self-perceptions 
of the officers as members of professional, modern 
organization. Increased firepower, sophisticated weapons, 
large installations, and even the quality of uniforms are 
taken as indicators of modernity and professional 
expertise. Officers who are denied funds for the purchase 
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of such equipment may then develop interventionist motives 
out of wounded pride and resentment toward their civilian 
political leaders. 
Consequently, many coups are the product of a 
conjunction between the officers’ interest in adequate 
budgetary support and the unwillingness or inability of 
civilian political leaders to satisfy them. 
B. MILITARY AUTONOMY 
Interference in the internal affairs of the military 
by the civilian political leaders may accelerate the 
breakdown of civil-military relations. Trespasses upon 
military reservation by civilians are always seen as 
attacks upon its corporate interests. This is because 
military autonomy may sometimes exclude civilian 
involvement in shaping the educational and training 
curriculum, the assignment of officers to particular posts, 
the promotion of all but the most senior officers, and the 
formulation of defense strategies. 
Civilian interference has a multiple and decided 
impact upon the officers. Such actions may generally lower 
the professional competence and self image of officer corps 
by substituting political for achievement criteria, call 
into doubt the soldiers’ identities as independent and 
respected officers, factionalize an otherwise cohesive 
officer corps, warp the hierarchical structure, and weaken 
the officers’ power to defend their other corporate 
interests. Because of the many important ways in which 
civilian interference is perceived to adversely affects the 
military, it has always been a source of the breakdown in 
civil-military relations. 
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C. THE ABSENCE OF FUNCTIONAL RIVALS AND THE SURVIVAL OF 
THE MILITARY 
The absence of functional rivals and the very survival 
of the military are closely related. They are almost always 
affected by the same threat: the creation or expansion of a 
militia under civilian control. 
The establishment of a sizable popular militia calls 
into doubt the military adequacy and reliability as 
guarantors of national security. The dilution of this 
responsibility and its assignment to professional inferiors 
with insufficient training, expertise, and experience can 
only be interpreted as stinging insult within the officer 
corps. The political power and prestige of the military are 
also affected by the loss of its monopolistic control over 
the means of coercion. A relatively large militia forces 
may serve as a powerful counterweight to the regular army, 
thereby reducing its ability to ensure adequate budgetary 
support and noninterference in military affairs. It also 
represents a clear signal to the military: the armed forces 
are replaceable. 
Nordlinger states that President Keita of Mali and 
some other African leaders were overthrown for this reason. 
At the time of the 1968 coup in Mali, the paramilitary 
people’s militia outnumbered the army by roughly three to 
one and undertook night patrol work and border 
surveillance. In addition, the militia enjoyed a privileged 
position as an integral part of President Keita’s single 
party regime, thereby challenging the army special status 
even before it became known that it was intended to replace 
the army. The officers’ pride was deflated further when 
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illiterate youths with machine guns questioned their 
authority. Since the senior army commanders were 
politically and personally loyal to the president, it was 
left to a group of lieutenants to execute the coup, after 
which the militia was immediately disbanded. Nordlinger 
further states that the apparent lesson in Mali was learned 
in neighboring Niger Republic, where President Diori 
steadily undermined the army’s position during the early 
1970s. The hostility and wounded professional pride 
engendered by Diori’s goal of gradually replacing the 
Nigerian army with a militia organized within his single 
party regime eventuated in the 1974 coup.     
Consequently, the attributes, role, and self-interest 
motives of the military appear to be more convincing causal 
factors of coups than the other structural explanation. 
This is because virtually every state in Africa, regardless 
of its structural, systemic, or other environmental 
conditions, has experienced some form of military 
intervention attributable to some aspect of the military as 
an institution.    
Thus, the prospects for a successful democratization 
in any area of the world are inextricably linked to 
reliable civilian control of the military. (Desch, 1999, 5) 
In other words, “the development, quality, and survival of 
democratic systems depend on governments making the armed 
forces their political servants and policy instruments 
rather than the other way round. (Pion-Berlin, 2001, 1) In 
short, the integrated system that is a consolidated 
democracy can only grow and develop if the transition is 
sustained, and the sustainability of democratic transitions 
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has been closely tied to the disposition of the military in 
Africa.  In other words, "as went the military, so went the 
transition." (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, 217)  Thus, 
the first major impediment to a successful democratization, 
especially in Africa, is poor civil-military relations. 
Most people think about civil-military relations 
strictly in terms of coup. In other words, if there are 
coups, then civil-military relations are bad, if not they 
are good. Although, this assumption might hold ground in 
Nigeria and other countries in Africa that have experienced 
repeated military coups, there are many other aspects of 
civil-military relations. “ Civil-Military relations is a 
complex array of military behaviors and civil-military 
interactions, some positive and some negative, that need to 
be assessed in order to understand just how much further 
down the road politicians need to travel before they have 
achieved military compliance.” (Pion-Berlin, 2001, 2) 
Consequently, coup or no coup question is not the only 
problem of civil-military relations as it is possible, 
especially in developed democracies, to have poor civil-
military relations without the threat of coup. 
Diamond and Plattner (1996) identify four general 
problems affecting civil-military relations in various new 
democracies as, military intervention in politics, pre-
existing military privileges, the definition of roles and 
missions, and the development and diffusion of new military 
technology.  Desch (1999) also brought up other issues in 
civil-military relations apart from coups .He examined some 
indicators of civil-military relations put forward by other 
analysts, before presenting what he considers the best 
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indicator. According to him, some analysts use the extent 
of military influence in areas beyond strictly military 
issues as a measure of civil-military relations. By this 
indicator, good civil-military relations exist when the 
military concerns itself exclusively with military affairs. 
Others may argue that excessive military influence on 
national policy debates is a potential problem. Some 
observers also look to the frequency of conflict between 
military and civilian leaders as an indicator in that a 
state has good civil-military relations when there are few 
conflicts. Still other suggests that the state of civil-
military relations should be measured by how much civilians 
and military officers like and respect one another. Some 
believe that good civil-military relations are whatever 
results in effective military policies. 
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The best indicator of the state of civilian control is 
who prevails when civilian and military preferences 
diverge. If the military does, there is a problem; if the 
civilians do, there is not. The level of civilian control 
can be determined by whether or not civilians prevail in 
disagreement with the military. Civilian control is weak 
when military preferences prevail most of the time; the 
most extreme example is military rule or military coups 
that oust one civilian regime and install another or 
itself. It is a less serious problem for civil-military 
relations when military preferences prevail only some of 
the time, though civilian control is still not firm. 
Finally, civilian control is firm when civilian preferences 
prevail most of the time. Therefore, Desch warned that if 
the military is not under firm civilian control, it could 
represent a serious threat to democracy. (Desch, 1999, 4) 
Having identified the major obstacle to stable 
democracy, one may identify an antidote to the failure of 
democratization in Africa. This antidote is the prevention 
of military intervention and maintaining civilian control 
of the military. Many authors have observed that a number 
of countries have already made visible progress in recent 
years toward establishing civilian supremacy over the 
military. In order to spread this progress throughout the 
new democracies of the third wave, clear lessons must be 
drawn about the conditions for achieving a lasting, 
democratic pattern of civil-military relations. Diamond and 
Plattner (1996) presented these lessons. 
The first lesson, according to them, is to be clear 
about goals. Civilian supremacy entails more than simply 
minimizing military intervention in politics. It requires 
establishing the primacy of elected, civilian authorities 
(executive and legislative) in all areas of policy, 
including the formulation and implementation of national 
defense policy. Thus the head of government, working 
through a civilian-led and authoritative ministry of 
defense, must have the capacity to determine budgets, force 
levels, defense strategies and priorities, weapons 
acquisitions, and military curricula and doctrines; and the 
national legislature must at least have the capacity to 
review these decisions and monitor their implementation. 
It should however be noted that democracies must 
subordinate military to civilian authority while still 
granting significant scope for the military to exercise its 
professional judgment and competence within the broad 
policy parameters that civilian set. This will involve 
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considerable autonomy for the military in officer promotion 
(except at the highest level) training of soldiers, war-
fighting tactics, and so on. Moreover, if civilian 
politicians are to be effective in winning and maintaining 
military acceptance of their supremacy, it will also 
involve substantial participation by the military in the 
budgeting, procurement, strategy, and policy decisions that 
civilians ultimately make. 
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The second paramount lesson and the greatest 
imperative for avoiding a military coup is effective 
democratic governance. This lesson is based on the premise 
that military establishments do not seize power from 
successful and legitimate civilian regimes. They usually 
intervene in politics when civilian politicians and parties 
are weak and divided, and when their divisions and manifest 
failures of governance have generated a vacuum of 
authority. However, as the weakness and inefficacy of 
civilian politics invite military intervention, so can 
strong political institutions and unity of democratic 
purpose among civilian political elites – backed by broad 
and manifest citizen support – help to roll back the 
political prerogatives of the military. But where the 
military itself has controlled the pace and character of 
the transition from authoritarian rule, establishing 
civilian supremacy is a much more formidable task. This is 
especially so where the military has a long tradition of 
intervention and rule and has acquired substantial domains 
of power in the state and the economy – as in Latin 
America, Africa, and much of Asia – narrowing military 
prerogatives can be a risky business, requiring for success 
all the classic instruments of effective politics like 
broad coalitions, persuasive communication, a clear vision 
of ultimate goals and a sequential strategy for achieving 
them, deft balancing of cost and rewards, and a shrewd 
sense of timing. Establishing civilian supremacy, 
therefore, depends in part on the quality of civilian 
political leadership and strategy. The more entrenched is 
the military’s role in politics, the more crucial these 
political variables become. 
The contradictory nature of the imperatives 
confronting civilian political leaders in democracies with 
politically powerful militaries has been known to heighten 
their political dilemma. This is because, on the one hand, 
civilian supremacy requires reducing military prerogatives 
and restricting the military to a much narrower, defense-
centered professional mission. On the other hand, political 
stability requires keeping civil-military conflict to a 
minimum. Reducing military prerogatives and power almost 
invariably generates conflict between civilian and military 
authorities, as it is difficult to maximize both these 
goals simultaneously. Therefore, another lesson for the new 
democracies is that, barring some event that dramatically 
reduces military power and standing in society, 
democratization of civil-military relations needs to rely 
on processes of bargaining, dialogue, cooperation, and 
consensus-building that gradually diminish military 
prerogatives and redefine and professionalize the 
military’s mission through a series of incremental steps. 
The fourth lesson is what Diamond and Plattner call 
gradualism. This means that time is needed for civilian and 
military elites to adapt to new structures and to develop 
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confidence and trust in one another. Military officers in 
particular need to become convinced that expanding civilian 
control will not compromise the nation’s security or the 
institutional prestige and integrity of the military. Time 
is also needed for civilian empowerment, whereby civilians 
develop the substantive competence to manage and monitor 
military budgets, acquisitions, training, promotions, and 
operations intelligently and responsibly. Building up 
sufficient civilian expertise to staff the defense 
ministry, the foreign intelligence bureau, and legislative 
oversight committees and to provide the more informal 
guidance and scrutiny that must come from the academy, the 
policy community, and the mass media is a long process. 
Still another lesson is that civil-military conflict 
can be controlled and confidence enhanced if civilian 
leaders always accord the military a position of high 
status, honor, and income. Military officers and soldiers 
who are being asked to accept difficult changes in their 
functions, in their institutional size and resources, and 
in their fundamental conception of their national role and 
mission should be reassured that their role under the new 
arrangement will be greatly valued by the country, and that 
their service is honored and appreciated. Soldiers should 
be paid decently, and they should never have to worry about 
whether they would be paid (no matter how dire the fiscal 
crisis of the state). Officers’ incomes and pensions should 
be competitive with private sector management positions, 
not only to induce loyalty to the reform process, but also 
to deter corruption. 
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The sixth lesson is that civilian officials must act 
with restraint in their relation with the military. Not 
only must they resist the temptation to turn to the 
military for support in situation of political conflict, or 
as an instrument of first resort to quell unruly domestic 
protests, but they must also repay respect with respect, 
granting the military the autonomy to conduct its training 
and operations and assign and promote its officers in 
accordance with professional standards and criteria, 
without political interference at the micro level. 
In conclusion, the relevance of the foregoing theory 
of democratic transitions and civil-military relations is 
that it gives us some insights into civil-military 
interactions, with a focus on understanding what is that 
civilian democratic leaders have (haven’t) done, can 
(can’t) do, or should (Shouldn’t) do to subordinate the 
armed forces to their will. It also shows that if democracy 
works in other aspects, it is likely over time to bring 
progress in civil-military relations as well. 
Having examined the general theory of democratic 
transitions and civil-military relations, the next chapter 
will beam its searchlight specifically on the roots of the 
failure of democratic transitions and civil-military 
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II. ROOTS OF THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS 
AND CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA: THE STRUCTURAL 
ARGUMENT 
The aim of this chapter is to take another look at the 
argument attributing the failure of democratic transition 
and consolidation in Nigeria to structural problems. It 
will argue that the structural factors identified in the 
literature, such as economic underdevelopment and ethnic 
fragmentation cannot in and of themselves explain recurrent 
military coups, since a number of African countries with 
similar problems have successfully maintained civilian 
regimes. It will also show that the military’s own 
justification for coup making, the corruption of the 
civilian government, is equally unpersuasive, given that 
military regimes have been as corrupt as their civilian 
counterparts. It will therefore conclude that structural 
problems, though necessary, were not sufficient to cause 
the total collapse of democracy in Nigeria. This chapter 
examines Larry Diamond's (1988) influential structural 
analysis of the failure of Nigeria's First Republic, 
considering whether the argument holds up to comparative 
analysis.  I will examine Diamond’s three major structural 
arguments, namely, economic underdevelopment, ethnic 
fragmentation, and corruption, in Nigeria and Kenya.  
Claude E. Welch, Jr. describes the situation in Nigeria 
between 1960 and 1966 as that of a state of violence. 
Military units had to be called in to quell major 
outbreaks of rural arson; riot police and tear 
gas had to be employed when members of one 
regional legislature fought; the leader (Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo) of the main opposition party 
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(Action Group) was convicted of conspiracy to 
commit treason; there was a census crisis in 
1962; a general strike rocked the country in 
1964; two of the three major parties called for a 
boycott of the 1964 federal elections, and severe 
constitutional paralysis was averted by only a 
hair’s breadth. Probably most important in the 
progressive breakdown of political institutions 
was the crooked Western (Region) election of 
October 1965 and the ultimate debasement of 
democratic process in the re-imposition of an 
unpopular government through chicanery and 
thuggery. Law and order appeared on the verge of 
breakdown, with more than 2,000 killed in the 
course of the campaign and balloting. Declaration 
of martial law and occupation by federal troops 
to prop up the unpopular Western Region 
government seemed likely early in 1966. It was in 
the context of preempting a possible government 
action directed against a major group of its own 
citizens that a small group of young, radical 
Nigerian officers decided to act the night of 
January 15-16, 1966, by executing several 
political leaders whom they saw as responsible 
for the growing anarchy, corruption and 
tribalism, [thus bringing to an end the first 
attempt at democratization].(1987:104-105) 
What then were the causes of the major crises that led 
to the failure of that first attempt at democratization? 
For explanation we turn to Larry Diamond (1988:290-316) who 
identifies the causes as economic underdevelopment, ethnic 
division and conflict, and corruption, extravagance, 
inequality and waste. 
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Diamond identifies the first and most elementary cause 
of the collapse of democracy in Nigeria as economic 
underdevelopment or what he calls “the failure of 
development”. He posits that “the low level of national 
development and the narrow base of modern economic 
institutions, opportunities and talents presented obstacles 
to rapid economic growth and provided fertile soil for 
mushrooming corruption and waste, which only compounded the 
difficulty of generating economic growth.” 
Despite the existence of enormous agricultural, 
mineral and human resources on which to build a foundation 
of stable growth, the “Independence” generation of Nigerian 
politicians failed to get the economy moving quickly enough 
“to prevent the aggravation of ethnic socioeconomic 
competition and the swelling of popular discontent.” That 
failure manifested itself in poor planning, inefficient 
administration and widespread political interference. With 
respect to planning, Diamond identifies the chief failure 
as the stressing of industrial over agricultural 
development. He argues that the heart of any development 
strategy for Nigeria had to be in agriculture, where the 
overwhelming bulk of the people were. According to him, 
Nigerian policy makers were caught on the horns of a 
familiar dilemma. “If they did not steer development 
resources to the towns and increase employment there, 
instability would likely result. But if they neglected the 
countryside at the expense of the towns, they risked, if 
not widespread peasant unrest, at least a continued flow of 
migrants to the cities, overwhelming the benefits of 
development spending there. Moreover, the neglect of 
agriculture would mean neglect of the economy (both 
domestic and export), since agriculture accounted for the 
largest share of gross product.” 
Diamond gives the example of the deterioration of 
rural conditions and agricultural prices in Western Region 
as a contributing factor to the collapse of the First 
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Republic through the eruption of peasant rebellion in that 
part of the country in late 1965. Although massive 
electoral fraud and repression was the fuse for that 
explosion, he contends that it had been building through 
years of severe neglect. “Medical facilities, water 
supplies, roads, and electricity were inadequate or absent 
altogether. Children were being sent to primary schools, 
and many to secondary schools, only to fail in the search 
for a job. At the same time, this process was drawing them 
off the Region’s farms, contributing to a scarcity of labor 
that caused a fall in food production there in 1964 and 
1965.”  Consequently, in the context of the extraordinary 
popular expectations for personal and national progress, 
this failure insured the collapse of the regime.    
In respect of ethnic fragmentation, Diamond contends 
that bitter and increasingly polarized ethnic conflict, and 
the coincidence of regional and party cleavages heavily 
contributed to the failure of the first democratic 
experiment in Nigeria. These features dominated the 1964 
Federal Election and every other election contest. It also 
fed upon itself during the 1950s, as ethnic parties quickly 
took power in each region and hardened their bases there, 
thus making each region a one party state. “This gave rise 
to a host of conflicts during the 1950s, which became 
incessant and inflamed in large measure because they were 
repeatedly tapping the same coinciding lines of cleavage.” 
After independence, “the conflict pattern rigidified along 
the major cumulative divides”. 
Diamond posits that the cooperation of the two of 
three major parties, the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) 
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and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), in 
their mutual design to destroy the third one, the Action 
Group (AG), was to be the last significant bridging of that 
divide. He noted that before the NPC/NCNC alliance against 
the AG was over, the NCNC recognized that in destroying its 
erstwhile Southern antagonist it had also removed an 
indispensable brake upon the North’s march to total 
political dominance.  
From then on, conflict reduced to a bipolar 
struggle between North and South, Hausa-Fulani 
and Igbo, and their respective political 
alliances. That both the census and the 1964 
Federal Election were approached as struggles for 
control of the Federation between North and 
South, and ended as fierce showdowns between 
North and East, owed much to the regional 
structure and the coincidence of cleavages it 
produced. The final chapter in this bipolar 
struggle, the 1965 Western Regional crisis, was 
the culmination of fifteen years of conflict 
between these regional/ethnic/political 
formation. 
That crisis was one of the reasons given by the military 
for bringing down the regime. 
As regards corruption, Diamond vividly paints its 
picture in Nigeria during the First Republic. He tells us 
that the scale was enormous. He says that the size of the 
personal fortunes built up by the Finance Minister in that 
regime, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, will probably never be 
known, but some ran into hundreds of thousands and millions 
of pounds. He expresses the belief that the total 
misappropriation by the political class must have amounted 
to a significant portion of the capital available for 
development spending.  
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Federal Ministers’ official salaries and 
allowances alone amounted to one per cent of the 
Federal Budget. When one considers that this was 
only a fraction of their total take: that others 
were helping themselves up and down the political 
and bureaucratic ladders; that contract were let 
at hugely overpriced sums, often to wholly 
incompetent firms; and that the portion of the 
budget spent on official salaries and benefits 
was particularly large in relation to that for 
productive investment; the accumulated drag on 
the development process looms large indeed. And 
this does not include the other elements of 
waste, the unproductive expenditures on prestige 
projects and buildings, which did little to 
improve peoples’ lives or to stimulate economic 
growth. 
According to him, “the politicians continued right up 
to the time of their overthrow to ignore the whispers of 
corruption – charges that were loudening into shouts and 
that were gradually undermining their standing among the 
leaders of opinion of the towns and the countryside.”   
There is no doubt that these political, social, 
economic, and cultural factors were at the origin of 
instability in Nigeria.  However, these factors were not 
sufficient to bring about the total collapse of democracy 
absent other factors related to the military as an 
organization. In other words, such structural factors are 
present, to some degree, in any coup attempt, but they may 
also be present without any coup taking place. The factors 
said to give rise to coup proneness in Nigeria are present 
in African countries where coups have not occurred or have 
not been successful. These countries include Angola, 
Botswana, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mozambique, and Mauritius. Others are Namibia, 
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Senegal, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. I will now examine the structural argument in 
relation to one of these, Kenya. 
Kenya’s colonial economy, like that of Nigeria, 
“displayed characteristics typical of an underdeveloped 
economy at the periphery, namely, the preponderance of 
foreign capital, the dominance of agriculture, the limited 
development of industry and heavy reliance on export of 
primary products and import of capital and manufactured 
consumer goods.” (Ochieng, 1989, 213). This underdeveloped 
state of the economy meant that independent Kenya would 
have to formulate policy that would not only arrest Kenya’s 
mounting urban and rural poverty and decay, but would also 
put the economy into the hands of the indigenous people. 
One of the major objectives of Kenyatta government 
after independence was to remove inequalities inherited 
from colonial period. Some of these inequalities came into 
being as a result of the uneven penetration of capitalism 
and Western influence in the country right from the onset 
of colonialism. For instance, before independence large-
scale agriculture, industry and commerce were dominated by 
non-Kenyans. Europeans controlled agriculture and industry 
while Asians dominated commerce and trade. Thus, one of the 
most urgent and pressing problems after independence was to 
break the foreigners’ dominance of the Kenyan economy and 
transfer it to Kenyans. 
Now, the pertinent questions are: to what extent has 
the post-independent Kenya guaranteed the promise of 
egalitarianism to her citizens? Has the growth in Kenya’s 
economy since independence and the mechanism of the 
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transfer of wealth to the Africans removed to any 
appreciable extent the inherited inequalities? Ogot and 
Ocheing’ (1995, 89-91) provide the answer. 
Ocheing’ cites reports compiled by the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) in 1972, and the World Bank in 
1975, both of which drew the attention of Kenyans to the 
problems of inequality and poverty during the Kenyatta era. 
The ILO report pointed out 
the development of the Kenyan economy has been 
accompanied by a growing imbalance within the 
country. The tendency of Nairobi and other urban 
areas to grow at the expense of the rural, the 
richer regions in relation to the poorer, has led 
to growing imbalances between regions and 
different groups of the population. 
The World Bank report of 1975 identified unemployment, 
poverty and income distribution as the disappointing 
aspects of Kenya’s development story. 
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What is clear from both reports is that Kenya’s 
economy is still externally orientated, making it highly 
open and vulnerable to external factors. Ocheing’ pointed 
out that the country’s external trade has been 
characterized by large balance of trade deficits as imports 
continue to exceed exports. This means that Kenya’s economy 
does not generate adequate surpluses for reinvestment in, 
and expansion of, the economy. Also, despite the 
government’s effort to improve agriculture – the mainstay 
of the country’s economy – declining international 
commodity prices and general deteriorating terms of trade 
have progressively pauperized the peasants, whose numbers 
have also been steadily increasing. Moreover, the 
government’s industrialization and investment policies tend 
to strengthen the dominance of multinational corporations. 
Thus, Kenya’s industries would continue to be dominated by 
multinational corporations and other foreign investors, who 
export their surpluses out of the country. 
Apart from the fact that Kenya’s economic performance 
has been both distorted and inhibited by its structural 
relationship to international capital,  
poverty within a large segment of Kenyan society 
has also been aggravated by secondary factors – 
including landlessness, adverse climate and soil 
conditions in some parts of the country, lack of 
adequate or relevant education, low wages, high 
cost of consumer goods and unemployment. For most 
Kenyan peasants, persistent poverty is also a 
result of lack of meaningful involvement in the 
monetary economy, as most of them still practice 
subsistence farming. (91)  
Consequently, like Nigeria, Kenya continues to remain a 
land of a few rich people and millions of poor folks. 
The foregoing clearly shows that both Nigeria and 
Kenya’s economies displayed characteristics typical of an 
underdeveloped economy. Nevertheless, in the forty years 
since independence, Kenya has never experience a successful 
coup d'état.  Thus, economic underdevelopment and 
inadequate economic policies cannot be a sufficient 
explanation for military interventions. 
Kenyan society, like Nigeria, is deeply divided 
according to ethnicity, or ethnic identity. Differences in 
religious and other basic values underlie and help to 
perpetuate these cleavages. The colonial period had 
formalized and hardened ethnic division as the colonial 
ruler established a system of administration based on a 
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division of Kenya by tribes. Also, as in Nigeria, ethnicity 
in Kenya and the colonial policy of divide and rule had 
created forms of ethnic identity and solidarity, popularly 
dubbed tribalism, largely unknown in pre-colonial times. 
Such ethnic identity was based on differences in language. 
Thus, linguistic divisions provided ready-dug lines of 
cleavage along which other conflict would be politicized. 
Consequently, ethnic instability has extended to the 
realms of governance. Miller and Yeager (1994, 76) reveal 
that the government of President Moi was widely suspected 
of inciting communal violence in west-central Kenya as a 
ploy to prevent, for “security reasons,” the holding of a 
national election in either 1991 or 1992. Earlier, during 
the 1980s, “an increasingly insecure regime had employed 
force to suppress Islamic fundamentalism among Arabized 
residents of Mombassa and other coastal towns.” On a wider 
scale, sub-cultural distinctions have become firmly 
institutionalized in parliament, whose constituencies 
continue to reflect the particular ethnic compositions of 
individual provinces. 
Ethnic identity and loyalty also manifest a strong 
influence in Kenyan society during the Kenyatta era and 
beyond. Political support, sport organization and 
employment patterns all reflected the pervasive influence 
of ethnicity. Moreover, “many of the social issues publicly 
aired during the initial decade of independence took on a 
pronouncedly ethnic or tribal character, as some ethnic 
groups, usually the Kikuyu, were said to be holding the 
best jobs in the public sector, having more schools, and 
having assumed a dominant role in business or the trade 
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union movement.”(Ogot and Ochieng’, 122) Thus, the problems 
of ethnic identity and conflict advanced as one of the 
reasons for the coups in Nigeria are also present in Kenya, 
where there have not been any successful coups. 
While not justifying political corruption, it must be 
recognized that the use and abuse of political office for 
personal pecuniary gain is a common feature of politics in 
less developed countries. The concentration and 
personalization of political power almost inevitably leads 
to corrupt practices.  In Kenya corruption has been 
rampant. N’Diaye (2001, 141) considers President Daniel 
Arap Moi’s regime as one of the two most corrupt in Africa, 
rivaling Mobutu’s infamous regime, which ruled Zaire until 
May 1997. Corruption and nepotism usually go hand in hand, 
and indeed President Moi is reported to have swarmed the 
civilian sector of the Kenyan government with officials 
from his ethnic group, the Kalenjin. He put family members 
and fellow Kalenjin and allies in top government positions, 
particularly those related to finance, and allowed them to 
illegally amass wealth. According to a survey conducted by 
Africa Confidential (26 October 1990) cited by N’Diaye, of 
the thirty-four top military and civilian positions in 
government, industry and commerce, only three were not held 
by the Kalenjin. Moreover, as corruption and mismanagement 
begin at the top, “Moi’s closest associates, such as Energy 
Minister Nicholas Biwott, are said to have embezzled 
millions of dollars in diverse schemes.” Moi himself was 
reported to have owned or had 
controlling interest in many companies involved 
in a variety of business activities, ranging from 
banking to manufacturing. The extent of Moi’s 
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corruption is such that many Kenyans [did] not 
exclude that one day the military may be 
compelled to overthrow him. 
Yet, Moi was not overthrown by the military. He voluntarily 
relinquished power after completing the two terms of office 
allowed by the Kenyan constitution, and his party was even 
defeated by a coalition of opposition parties in the 2002 
election.     
Having shown that structural factors, though 
necessary, were not sufficient to bring about recurrent 
military interventions in Nigeria, the next chapter will 
identify the intervening variable, which can explain both 
military intervention in Nigeria and the absence of 
military intervention in Kenya. 
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III. ROOTS OF THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS 
AND CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA: “AGENCY ARGUMENT” 
This chapter presents the major argument of the 
thesis, which is that the immediate causes of the collapse 
of the first democratic experiment in Nigeria are (i) 
military opportunism and more importantly, (ii) the failure 
of the newly elected democratic government to adequately 
address the military challenge.  A comparative analysis of 
Nigeria and Kenya shows that military opportunism was 
present in both cases, suggesting that the key explanatory 
variable is civilian strategies for containing the 
military.  Thus, the failure of the civilian masters in 
Nigeria to adequately respond to the challenge posed by 
military opportunism, signed the death warrant of 
democratization in that country.    
Why is military opportunism a better explanation of 
the 1966 Nigerian coup than the structural factors advanced 
in the literature?  In order to answer this question, it is 
necessary to consider briefly the course of the 1966 coup. 
There were actually two coups on 15 January 1966.  Major 
Nzeogwu led the first, which was aborted by the second, 
that of Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi.  
A. MAJOR NZEOGWU’S COUP  
Major Nzeogwu, an Ibo from the Nigeria’s Mid-Western 
Region who had been born in Kaduna (Northern Region), was 
an instructor at the Military Academy, Kaduna. On the night 
of 14-15 January he took some soldiers out on a training 
exercise. When they reached the vicinity of the residence 
of the Premier of the Northern Region, Ahmadu Bello 
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(Sardauna), the soldiers found that they had been issued 
with live ammunition and were told the full details of the 
plan.  
The soldiers then accepted their role, the 
residence of the Sardauna was stormed and he and 
his wife were murdered. On Saturday Major Nzeogwu 
broadcast over Kaduna radio, proclaiming martial 
law in the name of the Supreme Council of the 
Nigerian Armed Forces. On Sunday he appointed a 
government of civil servants in place of the 
deposed Northern Ministers. (Miners, 1971, 161)  
However, the success of the conspirators in the North 
was not repeated elsewhere.  
At about the same time they struck there, 
soldiers from the Armored Car Squadron arrived in 
Lagos to join up with other groups led by Major 
Okafor of Federal Guards, Lagos Island, and Major 
Ifeajuna from 2 Brigade Headquarters, Apapa, 
Lagos. These bands kidnapped the Prime Minister, 
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and the Minister of 
Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, and later 
murdered them. The rebels temporarily occupied 
some public buildings in Lagos and a broadcast 
was made announcing that the military had taken 
over. But this success was short-lived. According 
to Major Nzeogwu, General Ironsi was one of the 
bigwigs and compromisers whom the conspirators 
had decided to kill. Ironsi managed to escape the 
men sent to assassinate him in his house on Lagos 
Island and slipped out through north Lagos to the 
battalion at Ikeja. Ironsi rallied the battalion 
to his support. Troops from Ikeja were moved to 
Lagos and took over control of the capital from 
the conspirators. (162)  
Although the Premier of the West, Chief Akintola, was 
assassinated by another group of conspirators, the coup 
failed in the West, and no action took place in the Mid-
West and the East. 
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B. GENERAL IRONSI’S COUP   
According to the communiqué broadcast by the Nigerian 
Broadcasting Service on the afternoon of Saturday 15 
January, ‘The General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army 
and the vast majority of the Army remain loyal to the 
Federal Government, and are taking all effective method to 
bring the situation under control.’ But the question was, 
what constituted the Federal Government? The Minister of 
Defense, Inuwa Wada, was away in Europe for medical 
treatment, and Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, who had been 
kidnapped, temporarily held the Defense portfolio. 
The only recourse left to NPC (the ruling party) 
leadership to regain control of the situation was 
to ask for the help of British troops. The 
British High Commissioner was certainly consulted 
by the NPC. Naturally, the British denied that 
any request for military assistance had been 
made. If it was, it was refused. 165) 
Quite apart from the military difficulties, there was no 
one competent to make the request, because the acting 
President, Dr. Orizu refused to appoint an acting prime 
minister. 
Once the question of foreign intervention had been 
ruled out, there was very little that the cabinet could do 
except hand over to General Ironsi with the best grace that 
they could muster.  
The Cabinet met on Sunday 16 January and General 
Ironsi gave a survey of the position. He insisted 
that power must be handed over to him in order to 
save the situation and the ministers had perforce 
to agree. There was no provision in the 
constitution for such a hand-over to the army; 
but no one worried about such technicality. (165) 
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I briefly report the facts of the 1966 coups in order 
to show that General Ironsi, having aborted the Nzeogwu 
coup, could have protected the remnants of the Federal 
cabinet if he was not power hungry and opportunistic. Even 
the motives of the original conspirators were 
opportunistic, as they merely wanted to take advantage of 
the fragile situation instead of assisting to protect it. 
According to the conspirators themselves they were 
motivated by the desire to put an end to corruption, 
inefficiency and anarchy. Empirical evidence has shown in 
Nigeria that the successive military governments were not 
less corrupt or more efficient than the civilian 
governments they overthrew. It is on record that the 
military even promoted more anarchy by plunging the country 
into a three-year civil war. Thus neither the original 
conspirators nor General Ironsi had sufficient reasons for 
bringing about the collapse of democracy in Nigeria. By 
insisting that power must be handed over to him, General 
Ironsi merely took advantage of the situation, not because 
he was patriotic or that he intended to correct all the 
structural defects in the Federation. 
Military opportunism is certainly not unique to 
Nigeria. In Kenya, where there have been no successful 
coups, there have been at least four instances of military 
intervention in the political process. These include the 
1964 army mutiny, the 1971 conspiracy against Kenyatta’s 
government, the 1978 conspiracy to kill President Moi and 
several of his close collaborators, and the Air Force coup 
attempt of 1982. 
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The 1982 coup attempt was the most serious challenge 
to civilian supremacy in Kenya. N’Diaye (2001) provides a 
vivid description of that coup. 
On 1 August 1982 the Kenyan air force occupied 
the state radio station and announced the end of 
the Moi regime, drawing widespread popular 
support. The grievances of the putschists 
included economic hardship suffered by the Kenyan 
people, lack of freedom and widespread corruption 
of the Moi regime. 
Like the initial Nzeogwu coup in Nigeria, the Air 
Force coup in Kenya was aborted by further military 
intervention, in this case by the paramilitary General 
Service Unit (GSU).  However, in this case the GSU chose to 
hand power back to President Moi. 
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From the foregoing, it can be seen that both the 
Nigerian and Kenyan militaries are prone to intervene. The 
key question is why the GSU handed power back to the 
civilian regime while General Ironsi chose to appropriate 
it for himself.  The answers lies in the fact that while 
Kenya had relatively effective civilian control strategies 
in place, Nigeria either had none or pursues an ineffective 
one.Unlike Presidents Kenyatta and Moi who pursued similar 
civilian control strategies to check their military, the 
new democratic government of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in 
the First Republic failed to forestall the military 
challenge.  The politically naïve government failed to 
adopt any of the civilian control strategies used by other 
African states to forestall military coups. N'Diaye 
characterizes these strategies as: the legitimizing option, 
external guarantor option, payoff option, and political 
permeation and control option. (2001, 60) The only strategy 
used by the Balewa’s government to secure the loyalty of 
the military was higher pay.  
Between 1958 and 1960 the pay of most soldiers 
was roughly doubled to bring their level to the 
equivalent ranks of the police. From 1960 onwards 
the soldiers received large bonuses on their pay 
for service in the Congo. In October 1963, when 
the Congo operation was ending, the Minister of 
Defense told the troops that a new salary review 
for the Army was then about to be ratified by the 
Council of Ministers. ‘The army,’ he said, ‘is 
like an engine and must be regularly lubricated 
if it is not to lose its efficiency.’ This review 
raised the pay of all soldiers, but not officers, 
by about 25 per cent. (Miners, 1971, 101-102) 
There is no doubt that the pay-off option can be an 
effective means of securing the loyalty of the military. 
However, the government misapplied it by raising the pay of 
soldiers while that of the officer corps was left out. 
Although in exceptional cases soldiers have been known to 
topple civilian governments (e.g., Liberia), the vast 
majority of coups in Africa are conceived and executed by 
the officer corps. Therefore appeasing the soldiers with 
higher pay without any consideration for officer corps is 
clearly a misconceived strategy. 
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What then were the measures taken by Presidents 
Kenyatta and Moi that have led to the absence of successful 
coups in a civilian-ruled Kenya?  Unlike the post-
independence regime of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in 
Nigeria, Jomo Kenyatta seriously considered the possibility 
of coup attempts in Kenya, andtook necessary measures to 
subordinate the military to civil authorities. Since Moi, 
his successor, scrupulously followed Kenyatta's lead, I 
will pay attention to Kenyatta’s strategies. These 
strategies were a combination of: (a) the ethnic 
manipulation of the military through promotions and 
assignments, (b) the grant of material awards to officers, 
and (c) the use of paramilitary force as a counterweight to 
the military. (N’Diaye, 2001, 127) 
In shaping Kenya’s post-colonial civil-military 
relations, Jomo Kenyatta borrowed a leaf from the security 
measures that Great Britain used to put down the Mau-Mau 
insurrections of the 1950s. Because the police played a 
prominent role in repressing the insurrection, it led to 
the perception that the police, especially the GSU, would 
be needed to play a crucial role in the new state. Thus, 
Kenyatta concentrated his attention on the General Service 
Unit. 
Kenyatta made the General Service Unit a highly 
mobile, well equipped, and well disciplined semiautonomous 
paramilitary force within the Kenyan police. During his 
tenure, the GSU received two times as much in public funds 
as all the other military services combined together. Apart 
from making the GSU a perfect counterweight to the 
military, Kenyatta also put in place logistical operational 
measures, which made it harder for any of the regular 
services to stage a coup. These included keeping the army 
small, dispersing infantry units throughout Kenya, and 
making the rapid deployment of army units dependent on the 
air force. “On top all these, the GSU was made almost 
entirely Kikuyu-dominated.” (Horowitz, 1985, 533) 
It must be noted that at independence Kenyatta 
inherited an army overwhelmingly officered by Kamba, and 
was faced, already in 1964, by a plot involving the Kamba 
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Chief of Staff. Thus, Kenyatta moved rapidly to transform 
the ethnic balance in the armed forces in favor of his own 
ethnic group, the Kikuyu. However, it was not possible for 
him to create a largely Kikuyu army in a country where the 
group was in a minority (21 percent), and where other 
groups (the Kamba, Kalenjin) had historic claims to 
military careers. In view of this reality, Kenyatta began 
to pack the officer corps at junior levels – for the long 
run – while setting up other control units, like the GSU, 
with Kikuyu personnel. 
According to Decalo (1998), the thrust behind 
Kenyatta’s policy was to attain a balance of power whereby 
a move by the army as a whole would call for a degree of 
trust and cooperation between Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu 
officers. A move by Kikuyu officers alone would probably 
bring a reaction from non-Kikuyu in the lower ranks, while 
intervention by non-Kikuyu officers alone could be expected 
to bring a counter-move by the GSU and other elements of 
the police under Kikuyu control. (114) 
Kenyatta’s third coup prevention strategy was to 
extend material privileges in the form of a payoff to 
senior military officers. This strategy targeted individual 
senior officers as well as the military as a corporate 
body. For example, N’Diaye (129) writes that in the 1960s 
almost two-thirds of the Kenya’s military budget went to 
pay and allowances, most of it going to officers. In 
addition, senior officers commanding the army and the air 
force during the Kenyatta years were engaged in large scale 
cash crop farming on land secured at giveaway prices and 
low interest rates, in lucrative smuggling activities and 
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in trade and commerce, especially trucking. Consequently, 
it was the self-interest of the officers that constituted 
the glue binding military elites to civilian authority. 
There is no doubt that these combined strategies played a 
crucial role in ensuring that Presidents Kenyatta and Moi 
remained in power without a successful coup. 
In conclusion, this chapter has attempted to show that 
the explanation of the collapse of the first democratic 
experiment in Nigeria rests upon the inadequate response of 
the new democratic government to the challenge of military 
opportunism. Using Kenya as comparative analysis, it was 
shown that Kenya shares the same structural problems as 
Nigeria. Also Kenya’s military were shown to be as 
opportunistic as their Nigerian counterpart. The only 
difference is that the Kenyan political leaders right from 
the onset recognized the dangers of military opportunism 
and immediately devised civilian control strategies to 
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IV. IN SEARCH OF APPROPRIATE CIVILIAN CONTROL 
STRATEGIES FOR NIGERIA 
So far, this thesis has attempted to show that 
structural problems and military opportunism are necessary 
but not sufficient to cause the collapse of democracy in 
Nigeria. More generally, these problems are ‘given’ in 
post-colonial African countries and nothing can be done to 
avoid them in the short run.  Nevertheless, military 
intervention can be forestalled by effective civilian 
control strategies, as the Kenya case demonstrates.  The 
aim of this chapter is to discuss the full range of control 
strategies that have been utilized by African states, 
examine how well the strategies have worked for these 
countries, evaluate their relevance to Nigeria, and 
recommend the appropriate strategies for adoption in 
Nigeria today. 
Before delving into the discussion of different 
control strategies, it is pertinent to pause and explain 
the difference between what Samuel Huntington (1957) 
referred to as ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ civilian 
control. According to Huntington, subjective control arises 
from an ‘identity of thought and outlook between civilian 
and military groups.’ There is a permeation of the military 
and civilian values, a convergence of interests. By 
contrast, objective control depends upon clearly defined 
boundaries and hence a low level of civilian-military 
interpenetration except at the highest command levels; a 
high degree of military professionalism; and the reciprocal 
acceptance by civilians of an independent sphere of 
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military authority. Huntington summarizes the distinction 
thus: the ‘essence of objective civilian control is the 
recognition of an autonomous military professionalism; the 
essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an 
independent military sphere.’ (85) 
Moreover, a study of civilian control of the military 
must be grounded on questions about legitimacy and 
effectiveness of civilian institutions. In explaining the 
relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness and the 
forms of civilian control, Goldsworthy hypothesizes as 
follows:  
the higher the levels of legitimacy and 
effectiveness, the more likely it is that control 
will take ‘objective’ forms (self-restraining 
military professionalism is more likely to 
develop in a society that is stable, well-
structured etc.); and the lower the levels of 
legitimacy and effectiveness, the likely control 
is to assume ‘subjective’ forms (in a situation 
of value confusion, poor institutionalization, 
etc., military allegiance to government depends 
much more on informal linkages, merging of class 
interests, and so on).(1981, 56) 
Objective civilian control, which has withstood the 
test of time, is used in the highly industrialized states, 
and in few less developed states such as India and 
Malaysia. In contrast, the peculiar evolution of Africa’s 
post-colonial systems and the legitimacy crisis which 
characterized most of them, suggest that subjective 
patterns of control will be found to be much more common. 
The rest of the chapter will be devoted to answering 
the following pertinent questions. What were the control 
strategies used by African states to maintain civil-
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military stability? How well did the strategies worked for 
these countries? How well would they have worked in Nigeria 
to maintain civil-military stability in the First Republic? 
I will conclude the chapter by proposing strategies for an 
enduring civil-military stability in Nigeria.  
The actual control strategies pursued by African 
states are the external guarantor strategy, the payoff 
strategy, and the legitimizing strategy. 
The external guarantor strategy is the existence of 
external guarantees of military assistance in case of 
domestic upheavals, which inhibits civil-military 
turbulence. This strategy has three sub-strategies. The 
first is the hosting of foreign troops on the national 
territory as a deterrent to coups and a means to maintain 
control over the military. France is the sole power with a 
priori military commitments, and a credible deterrent 
military presence in Africa (Decalo, 1998, 126) There are 
standing French presence of this kind in Gabon, Ivory 
Coast, Senegal and Cameroon. In all these countries the 
French military has at some stage intervened to protect the 
incumbent government against the threat of military 
usurpation. For example, in 1964 French troops returned to 
power the late president Leon M’ba of Gabon after a 
successful coup toppled him. Thus, this strategy is not 
only effective in preventing but also reversing coups in 
progress. 
Inserting expatriate officers into the hierarchy of 
the military is second sub-strategy. The expatriates 
provide intelligence and a deterrent presence, which lessen 
the likelihood of a successful coup. (Decalo, 1989, 564) 
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Regional military cooperation is the third.  The 
presence of the troops of a militarily stronger neighbor is 
one aspect of this strategy for a civilian control. Libyan 
troops in Chad and Senegalese troops in The Gambia in the 
early 1980s, Tanzanian troops in the Comoros and Seychelles 
in the mid-1970s and the reinstatement of President Ahmad 
Tejan Kabah of Sierra-Leone by Nigerian troops in the mid-
1990s, after a successful coup, are examples of such 
situation. 
How well has this strategy worked for the countries 
that have adopted it? Let us consider the case of Ivory 
Coast.  France and Ivory Coast signed their defense 
agreement on April 24 1961. The agreement provided for the 
setup, training, and equipping of Ivorian military and the 
presence of French (military and civilian) technical 
advisers. It also provided for the permanent basing of 
troops and enable Ivory Coast to call on France to ensure 
their external and internal security (including 
reestablishing law and order). Thus, French troops based in 
the country have regularly joined with the Ivorian military 
in maneuvers to test their readiness to face external 
aggression or internal threats to the regime. (N’Diaye 
2001, 103) 
The major advantage of this strategy for Ivory Coast, 
especially the regime of President Felix Houpouet-Boigny is 
that the presence of the French troops constituted a 
critical insurance policy for Houpout-Boigny and his 
regime. This is because the presence of the French troops 
serves to deter upheavals or coup d’états. Even though 
Houpouet-Boigny’s regime was unpopular, French troops used 
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maneuvers to deter and dissuade potential opponents from 
even attempting a coup (N’Diaye, 2001, 105) Thus, it can be 
said that the external guarantor strategy worked well for 
Ivory Coast under Houpouet-Boigny in the sense that it was 
able to prevent coup in the short run. However, as noted in 
chapter one, the question of coup is not the only problem 
of civil-military relations. The situation in Ivory Coast 
under Houpouet-Boigny was that of poor civil-military 
relations without the threat of a coup. Though this 
strategy was effective in preventing coups, it had several 
negative effects on long-term civil –military stability in 
Ivory Coast, the result of which was the breakdown of 
civil-military stability in 2002/2003. 
First, it is natural that the military will resent a 
foreign military force. This is because in new states, the 
military constitutes an important symbol of nationhood and 
is always particularly sensitive to this issue. (Welch, 
1987, 188). In addition, permanent foreign military 
presence will be perceived as an infringement on the 
military’s monopoly in the use of violence. 
Second, giving the French president the decision 
whether to intervene also undermines sovereignty. For 
example, in June 1990 France ignored Ivory Coast president 
Houphouet-Boigny’s request and refused to intervene to put 
down military mutineers in June 1990 (N’Diaye, 2001, 106). 
This tends to introduce an element of uncertainty, which 
definitely does not promote civil-military stability. 
This pattern of foreign intervention may also lead to 
the politicization of the military by creating potential 
coup leaders ready to act on France's behalf. Hissen Habre 
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of Chad was ousted under this type of condition. Under this 
circumstance, military elites are alienated through mixed 
loyalties. The officer may display insincere loyalty to the 
regime, knowing that it is being protected by a foreign 
military. At the same, they are likely to remain distant 
from that regime should it become doomed by its foreign 
protectors. 
The presence of French military advisers is usually 
detrimental to long term civil-military stability. This is 
because it perversely entrusts French nationals to 
sensitive positions in African military and gives them 
access to information they can use to influence directly 
and decisively the course of domestic events.  Bearing in 
mind that defense agreements usually imply a commitment to 
regimes, as opposed to states, the external guarantor 
strategy worked well for Ivory Coast under the regime of 
Houpouet-Boigny. What happened after him is another story 
entirely. 
Would the external guarantor strategy have been 
appropriate for Nigeria? In answering this question it is 
necessary to state that the former French colonies were not 
alone in adopting this strategy. Many former British 
colonies did the same in the early 1960s. Miners (1971) 
informs us that during the last stage of the decolonization 
of the Nigerian military forces, a draft defense agreement 
was drawn up and initialed by the Nigerian political 
leaders at the 1958 constitutional conference. The Anglo-
Nigerian Defense Agreement was presented to the Nigerian 
House of Representatives for ratification in November 1960. 
The Agreement was about the provision of instructors, 
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equipment and training facilities, and arrangement for air-
staging rights. Although the opposition party, the Action 
Group and other radical nationalists who organized 
demonstrations against the pact condemned the Agreement, 
the government still forced the measure through the house. 
However fifteen months later in January 1962 the Anglo-
Nigerian Defense Pact was abrogated, by agreement with 
Britain. (61) 
The external guarantor strategy would have worked in 
Nigeria, at least to prevent the 1966 coups. When Major 
Nzeogwu’s coup was aborted and everything appeared 
uncertain, the only recourse left to the NPC leadership to 
regain control of the situation was to ask for the help of 
British troops. Indeed, the request for military assistance 
was made through the British High Commissioner in Lagos. It 
was refused. As a result, there was very little that the 
remnants of the Federal Cabinet could do except hand over 
power to General Ironsi. If the Anglo-Nigerian defense pact 
had been in force, General Ironsi could not have insisted 
that power must be handed over to him. Consequently, the 
external guarantor strategy would have been appropriate for 
Nigeria at that time. It would have at least helped to 
prevent coups in the short run, buying the inexperienced 
democratic government the time needed to develop good 
civil-military relations in the long run.      
The second instrument of civilian control is what is 
called the payoff strategy. This strategy “rests on a tacit 
but visible trade-off of material benefits (to the military 
as a corporate body, and to officers as individuals) in 
exchange for political fealty.”(Decalo, 1998, 132) With 
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this strategy, stability is only guaranteed with the 
satisfaction of group and individual needs of the armed 
forces. In other words, the military becomes a vital 
constituency that has to be ‘taken care of’ through the 
spoils of office. 
The payoff strategy has two sub-strategies. The first 
consist of paying off high-ranking individual officers in 
order to divert them from attempting to stage a coup. It 
can be done in different ways. The government may provide 
lavish benefits to officers in the form of salaries, 
bonuses and overseas assignments. Officers may also be 
allowed to engage in private lucrative, often illegal 
economic activities. Others may be invited to join the 
government or hold important managerial positions in 
government-controlled public companies as a means of self-
enrichment. The second sub-strategy is the balancing and 
manipulation of ethnic groups in the military through the 
distribution of monetary and non-monetary rewards such as 
promotion and appointments. 
Kenya is a good example of an African country where 
civilian regimes forged a measure of control over their 
armed forces through the payoff strategy. The previous 
chapter established that this strategy worked to forestall 
successful coups in Kenya, but did not eliminate the threat 
of military intervention in politics, nor the 
politicization of the military.   
Would the payoff strategy have been appropriate for 
Nigeria? The answer is yes, if it had been properly applied 
as in Kenya. But it was not. Instead of paying off high-
ranking individual officers or increasing the pay of the 
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officer corps, the new government “raised the pay of all 
soldiers, but not officers, by about 25 per cent”(Miners, 
102). The new government also did not give enough attention 
to ethnic balancing in the military, especially those of 
the officer corps. For example, at independence, only 14 
per cent of the Nigerian officers were from the North 
(eight out of fifty seven). Yet the Prime Minister, a core 
northerner, refused to introduce quota system for officers 
because “army needed all the officers it could get, from 
whatever region” (Miners, 115) Although his approach would 
be ideal in a stable, advanced democracy, it was the height 
of political naivety in an unstable, multi-ethnic, nascent 
democracy. The composition of the coup plotters in January 
1966 and the victims of that coup showed that the Prime 
Minister was insufficiently attentive to the ethnic 
balancing that was appropriate at that time. 
According to Miners, of the 32 officers involved in 
the coup, only five were from the West while none was from 
the North. The majority was from the East. Also of all the 
victims consumed by the coup, none came from the East. 
Moreover, after the coup had been aborted, the General 
officer Commanding (GOC), Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, who 
hijacked the government from the Northern Peoples’ Congress 
(NPC), came from the East. 
The third instrument of civilian supremacy is the 
legitimizing strategy. This strategy consists of five sub-
strategies. The first strategy, which  “has nothing to do 
with the military at all” (Goldsworthy 1981, 55), is the 
provision of “good government” to the people in order to 
earn legitimacy in their eyes. Although good government may 
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mean different things to some individuals and groups, in a 
democracy good government will generally entail: 
instituting a transparent political system; holding regular 
free and fair election; providing honest and responsive 
leadership; not repressing or oppressing political 
opposition; and respecting people’s civil and human rights. 
The strategy is based on the premise that if a society 
regards its political system (and hence its government) as 
legitimate, then so will the armed forces, which is drawn 
from that society to serve the government (Goldsworthy, 
1981, 55). 
The second sub-strategy entails socializing the 
military in democratic values. In this regard, individual 
officers would have to be socialized to have respect for a 
democratic form of government and support civilian 
supremacy and democratic institution. This objective can 
best be achieved through education and training. 
The third is the professionalization of the military. 
It involves delineating for the military a well-defined 
sphere of autonomy conducive to “widespread acceptance” by 
the military of “an ethic of subordination” to the civilian 
authority (Welch, 1976, 6). This strategy is the bedrock of 
objective civilian control of the military. 
The fourth sub-strategy is for government to provide 
the military with adequate budgets and the most modern 
weaponry. In this sense, effective civilian control 
translates to giving the military what it needs to perform 
its duties. It is different from the payoff strategy where 
selected officers or ethnic groups within the military are 
the targets. Here, it is the military as an institution 
  54
that is the object of budgetary largesse on the part of the 
government. 
The fifth sub-strategy is the involvement of the 
military in socio-economic development tasks. Some civilian 
governments assign their militaries economic development 
missions such as bridge construction or economic 
exploitation of land. This approach may keep the military 
‘busy’ and thus less likely to be plotting to overthrow the 
government. It may also legitimize the civilian government 
in the eyes of its military by projecting the image of a 
government that values the military and acknowledges its 
contribution to national development. (N’Diaye, 2001, 61)  
Botswana is a good example of an African country that 
has adopted the legitimizing strategy as a way of achieving 
civilian control. The country is a multiparty democracy 
with an open political system in which political activity 
by the opposition is not unduly restricted. The government 
is also generally responsive to the needs of its citizens 
and relatively less corrupt, compared to some other African 
countries. Thus all evidence points to the fact that this 
strategy is working well for Botswana. The evidence 
includes: (a) the very limited number of instances of 
violent clashes between the government and its opposition, 
(b) the virtual absence of the use the use of the military 
against opponents, and (c) the total absence of instances 
of military restiveness such as mutinies, conspiracies, or 
coup attempts. (N’Diaye, 2001, 80)       
There is no doubt that only what Huntington calls 
“objective control” of the military, and a political regime 
pursuing legitimizing strategies in its relations with its 
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military and its citizens, is likely to achieve a sustained 
low level of vulnerability to coups. 
Could this ‘ideal’ strategy have worked well for 
Nigeria at independence? Definitely, it would have been 
impossible. This is because the legitimizing strategy is 
only possible in advanced transitions or consolidated 
democracies. As mentioned in chapter one, Linz and Stepan 
offered five interconnected and mutually reinforcing 
conditions (also referred to as arenas) that must exist or 
be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated. These are 
free and lively civil society, autonomous and valued 
political society, rule of law, a state bureaucracy, and an 
institutionalized economy society. These arenas were either 
non-existent or very weak in Nigeria at independence. 
Botswana was able to utilize the legitimizing strategy 
because it was free from most of the colonial hangovers 
suffered by Nigeria. It did not inherit a colonial army; 
hence it was able to delay the formation of its national 
army for some years while crafting its arenas of democracy. 
In the light of the foregoing, what should be the 
appropriate strategies for the new democratic experiment 
(since 29 May, 1999) in Nigeria? This question will be 
addressed in the conclusion. 
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V. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FOURTH 
REPUBLIC 
The aim of this conclusion is to draw lessons from the 
collapse of the First Republic and consider its 
implications for the survival of another democratic 
experiment, called the Fourth Republic, which came into 
life on 29 May 1999. 
If the Fourth Republic is to survive, there are three 
major lessons it must learn from the collapse of the First 
Republic. First, there is the need for the new government 
to recognize that military opportunism is always there and 
will remain a threat to the new democracy. The civilian 
leadership in the First, Second and Third Republics failed 
to recognize this basic fact. As a result, those three 
republics are now history. 
The second lesson is for the new democratic government 
to have clear goals on how it intends to achieve a lasting, 
democratic pattern of civil-military relations. The Balewa 
led government in the First Republic seemed not to have 
clear goals on this and was merely drifting until its last 
days.    
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The third and most important lesson is for the 
government to be decisive and pursue a particular strategy 
or strategies to actualize its goals. The Balewa led 
government was not decisive on which strategy it wanted to 
pursue. It appeared to have started with the external 
guarantor strategy but later dropped it when the opposition 
party organized a demonstration against the Anglo-Nigeria 
Defense Pact. The payoff strategy was badly implemented, 
favoring soldiers with higher pay while neglecting the 
officer corps. There cannot be a better example of backing 
the wrong horse. Balewa also attempted the ‘ideal’ approach 
by refusing to introduce a regional quota system for 
officers at a time when his own region constituted half of 
the population of Nigeria, but had only 14 per cent of 
officers in the army, thereby doing the right thing at the 
wrong time. The lesson here is that even though the 
legitimizing strategy is adjudged as the ideal source of 
civil-military stability, it should not be dogmatically 
applied when the situation in a country is not ripe for its 
implementation. 
What then are the implications of these lessons for 
the choice of control strategies in the Fourth Republic?  
Most generally, the new political leadership must consider 
all the options available and make a choice based on the 
present situation in the country, while also paying 
attention to trends in the international community. Let us 
examine the three control strategies and the relevance of 
each to Nigeria in this new millennium. 
First, the external guarantor strategy can have no 
place in the new democratic Nigeria. The Nigeria military 
of today is different from that of the 1960s. Over the 
years, it has greatly improved in quality and quantity. It 
is combat tested domestically and in the international 
arena. It has engaged in a three-year civil war against a 
rebel army. It emerged victorious. The Nigerian military 
has grown to become a regional power in West Africa. Under 
the aegis of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), it restored 
peace in Liberia. Single handedly, the Nigeria military 
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succeeded in removing a military Head of State, Major Paul 
Koroma, who had overthrown the democratically elected 
government of President Tejan Kabah of Sierra Leone. Thus 
the Nigerian Armed Forces, itself a watchdog of some of its 
neighboring countries' militaries, has outgrown being 
watched by foreign troops. Embarking on such strategy would 
likely be perceived by the military as confrontational and 
may actually lead to the deterioration of civil-military 
stability instead of enhancing it. Besides, Nigerian public 
opinion rejected the idea over forty years ago and would 
likely to do again. 
Second, the payoff strategy also may be counter-
productive for civil-military stability considering the 
present circumstances in Nigeria. Unlike during the First 
Republic when the federal government was controlled by one 
section of the country, the present government is a 
reflection of all the ethnic groups in the country. This 
same situation also obtains in the military. Over the 
years, the quota system of recruitment and admission into 
the military academies has ensured that no section of the 
country dominates the military. Under these circumstances, 
it may be futile to appeal to ethnic sentiments or favor 
certain ethnic groups in order to buy their loyalty.   
Having ‘outgrown’ the external guarantor and payoff 
strategies, the new government has adopted since its 
inception in 1999, policies that can move them closer to 
the institutionalization of civilian control through the 
legitimizing strategy.  The first sign that the new 
government was determined to succeed in the legitimizing 
policies was its request for assistance from the United 
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States, a beacon of democracy. Within a few months of the 
new regime’s life, it invited the United States based 
Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) to 
conduct a Leaders Seminar, which was attended by top 
functionaries in the administration. It was followed 
shortly by a seminar on civil-military relations, mounted 
by the Center for Civil-Military Relations. In addition 
there have been numerous courses, conferences, seminars, 
and workshops mounted in different locations for Nigerian 
military officers and Ministry of Defense civilian 
officials. The United States' assistance to Nigeria in this 
respect is in fulfillment of two of the legitimizing 
strategies, namely, socializing the military in democratic 
values, and professionalization of the military, through 
education and training. 
Also as a sign of its determination not to resort to 
payoff strategy, the new government identified and retired 
all military officers that had held political appointments 
in the past. This was done to prevent them from 
‘contaminating’ the professional officers or exercising 
inordinate political ambition. The latter could not be 
ruled out, since these officers had tasted power before. 
On the political front, the rule of law and the 
separation of power are constantly being tested. 
Legislators have been effective in keeping the President on 
his toes through the threat of impeachment. The state 
governors have dragged the federal government to court over 
many issues, including the revenue sharing formula, 
resource control, creation of a state electoral body to 
conduct local government election, among others. 
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Despite the occasional outbreaks of ethnic and 
religious violence that have dented the country’s image, 
the government is gradually building civil institutions 
that will be both legitimate and effective. There is no 
doubt many mistakes will be made along the way, or that it 
will take many years before the ‘five arenas’ of democracy 
are firmly established.  The most important thing, however, 
is that Nigeria is on the right track. 
This thesis has shown that structural explanations for 
the collapse of democracy in Nigeria in 1966, though long 
accepted, are insufficient. It further demonstrates that 
the immediate cause of the collapse was the failure of the 
young democratic government to respond to the challenge 
posed by military opportunism through adequate civilian 
control strategies. Thus, democratization is attainable in 
Nigeria if elected governments devise appropriate control 
strategies to check military opportunism while 
strengthening and legitimizing their own rule.  The first 
government of the Fourth Republic appears to have learned 
this lesson.  Constance vigilance on the part of successive 
governments will be essential as the Fourth Republic passes 
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